I am grateful to Tristan Stubbs for his interesting comments. He raises a number of important issues that bear further discussion.

Clearly we do not disagree on the importance of achieving democratic institutions and liberal political structures in the developing world. Let me focus, then, on the points where we do seem to diverge. Tristan says:

"Few would argue that the NHS is suffering, but to claim that this is the result of a lack of funding is patently untrue. Over the last nine years the Labour government has almost trebled pre-1997 investment, bringing funding in line with European levels. What is more, it has overseen the biggest ever redistribution of wealth to the poorest, lifted a quarter of children out of poverty, and introduced a minimum wage. And while proposed market reforms of public services may be worrying, they are by no means axiomatic for proponents of the Third Way."

This is all true. But now much of the government’s increased investment in the NHS is now being reversed as it applies sharp cuts to hospitals and medical services in order to deal with large deficits in the health budget. Cut backs in funding and increases in user fees throughout the network of public services, particularly in transportation, municipal functions, and higher education, are causing a major deterioration in both the quality and accessibility of these services. Moreover, the large gap between the wealthiest and poorest percentiles of the population has continued to grow rapidly. The trend towards the concentration of the country’s wealth in an ever decreasing proportion of the population remains unabated under the Labour government.

Stubbs goes on to state:

"I mentioned France’s troubles earlier; German unemployment, though improving, is running at eight per cent. Even the most successful social democratic party in the world, Sweden’s SSDP, risks defeat by a centre-right coalition after being blamed for rising joblessness and burgeoning social inequality. The reason for these countries’ difficulties? Their celebration of entrenched industrial interests precludes flexibility, a valuable currency in the globalised economy."

Implicit in this remark are the classical assumptions that powerful labour unions, strong protections for workers rights, and a comprehensive social welfare state invariably produce economic stagnation and high unemployment, while tax cuts for business, liberalization of the job market, accompanied by reduction in public expenditure on social services will generate high growth and low unemployment. These assumptions have been driving the steady erosion of the welfare state and labour rights in large parts of the western world for the past thirty years.

If one compares the economic performance over the past ten years of countries that have applied radical liberalizing economic measures, like the UK and the United States, with a range of western economies that have retained social democratic policies, it becomes clear that the classical assumptions do not, in general, hold.

Consider the productivity, growth, and unemployment indicators for the following countries, with roughly comparable per capita GDP, averaged over the ten year period of 1995-2004 (the statistics are compiled from OECD profiles of each country, which are available at www.oecd.org).

          Annual Increase in        Annual Growth        Unemployment
          Labour Productivity       in Real GDP
Denmark           1.64percent           2.13percent           5.23percent
France            2.13                  2.33                 10.13
Germany           1.8                   1.46                  8.38
Norway            2.34                  3.01                  4.05
Sweden            2.38                  2.85                  7.06
UK                2.11                  2.87                  6.03
USA               2.32                  2.75                  5.06

While France and Germany do indeed exhibit sluggish growth and productivity with relatively high unemployment, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, all of whom have more generous redistributive welfare states and labour protection than either of these countries, display relatively robust results. In fact, Norway outperforms the UK and the United States on all three indicators.

The OECD uses the Ginni Coefficient as an index to measure inequality of household disposable income on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing full equality among households and 100 maximal inequality among them. The measures of inequality for the six countries listed above from the mid-1980s through to 2000 (the latest date for which the OECD lists comparative figures for this index) are as follows.

               mid-1980s             mid-1990s                2000
Denmark           22.8                  21.3                  22.5
France            27.6                  27.8                  27.3
Germany           ....                  28.3                  27.7
Norway            23.4                  25.6                  26.1
Sweden            19.9                  21.1                  24.3
UK                28.6                  31.2                  32.6
USA               33.8                  36.1                  35.7

As expected, the Scandinavian social democracies consistently show the lowest degree of inequality, Britain and the United States the highest, with France and Germany in an intermediate position. While the Scandinavian countries have been remarkably successful in sustaining reasonable growth, productivity, and low unemployment within the framework of a strong welfare state, they have also clearly suffered from the increasing pressure that globalized markets have exerted on wages and social spending over the past decades, and this is reflected in the progressive rise of their inequality indices. As Stubbs suggests, this trend has become more acute in recent years.

Three primary responses to globalization have emerged. The neo-liberal approach celebrates it as both a positive and an inevitable phenomenon which requires us to embrace an unfettered free market. The constraints of the welfare state and the redistributive tax system required to support it are regarded as counterproductive obstacles to this process which must be dismantled as quickly and thoroughly as possible. The neo-liberals make no pretence of addressing the enormous social cost and labour instability produced by globalization, either in the West or in the developing world. They see the market as delivering the optimal solutions to these problems, despite compelling evidence to the contrary.

The anti-globalization movement regards globalization as a purely destructive force that serves the interests of a small corporate elite and visits devastation on the wage earning classes of the West, as well as the poor of the developing world. The supporters of this movement seek to halt its progress and return to an essentially localist economic system in which trade and markets are severely restricted. They ignore the fact that such economies would completely stifle growth. They would not be capable of generating the wealth needed either to alleviate poverty in the third world or to sustain the high standard of living that anti-globalizers demand for themselves in the West.

The advocates of the Third Way (as it is described in Anthony Giddens (1998), The Third Way, Polity Press, London, and implemented in the policies of New Labour) treat globalized markets as unavoidable and seek to cushion their social effects. They hope to do this through ameliorative measures like extensive job re-training programs, incentives for business to invest in deprived areas, and joint public-private provision of social services intended to reduce the burden of public spending in a way that avoids the collapse of these services. Third Way theorists do not provide substantive solutions to the profoundly disruptive effects of globalization in the West, nor do they address the problem of using the new wealth that it produces for social benefit in the developing world. They are essentially reluctant neo-liberals with a sense of social guilt.

I have been attempting to formulate a fourth approach on which the potential social benefits of globalization are realized by finding methods for transposing the constraints and redistributive mechanisms of classical social democracy from a national market, where they are increasingly ineffective, onto the emerging integrated global market. Such an approach recognizes the importance of this market for generating prosperity while seeking to harness its power in order to distribute its wealth to the largest possible number of people.

Shalom Lappin is Professor of Computational Linguistics in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London

Setting aside the tone of Tristan Stubbs’ remarks let me respond to what I take to be his main points.

1. Stubbs seriously misinterprets my account of the rise of radical Islamism. The fact that I identify this movement as, in part, conditioned by the failure of secular nationalism to deliver democracy or prosperity in post colonial third world countries certainly does not entail that I regard poverty as the major cause of Islamism, nor is my proposed description of this phenomenon “materialist” in any obvious sense. It is unclear to me on what basis Stubbs arrives at these thoroughly unmotivated inferences. I was simply suggesting that radical Islamism has been filling the political void left by the collapse of secular revolutionary nationalist ideologies thoughout the third world. This claim seems to be uncontroversial in that it amounts to little more than a straightforward description of the facts.

2. Stubbs asks how free trade unions can be established in third world countries that are ruled by repressive regimes which do not respect the rights of organized labour. This is a reasonable question. I suggested a partial answer in proposing that global free trade agreements be used as instruments for promoting democratic institutions, as well as social investment in the developing world. The obvious precedent here is the demand for democratization and respect for human rights that defines a necessary condition for entry into the European Union. It is also worth recalling that when union activists struggling against an undemocratic government enjoy widespread popular endorsement within their own country and receive strong support from abroad, they can, in some cases, effectively challenge their government. This is how Solidarity established itself both as a free labour union and the main engine of democratization within Communist Poland in the 1980s.

3. Stubbs claims that I have mistakenly identified Third Way politics with the neo-liberalism of the Thatcher era. Instead, he suggests, it aims to achieve prosperity by promoting entrepreneurial energy and freeing business from regulation in order to generate investment. This view is, from what I can see, indistinguishable from a vintage neo-liberal approach. It is unclear how it differs from the model proposed by conservative devotees of liberalized markets, low corporate taxation, and reduced business regulation. On this approach, a rise in living standards will invariably accompany the economic growth that is generated by reducing the burden of taxation and regulation on business activity. The problem with this theory is that it stands in marked contrast with the observed facts. The social gap between the richest and poorest segments of the population in Britain has grown considerably under recent Labour as well as the preceding Conservative governments. The wages of large sections of the labour force have grown very slowly or remained static in real terms. The quality of social services like the NHS and higher education, as well as the public transportation system are suffering from massive underinvestment. This pattern Is even more acute in the United States. In the Third World, rapid development through economic liberalization and investment has indeed led to the emergence of an expanding middle class and a reduction of poverty in countries like China and, to a lesser extent, India. However, large sections of the populations in these countries have been left out of the new economy and are sinking even deeper into poverty and dispossession. It should be clear that I am not calling for the destruction of the market, but for its deployment in a manner that maximizes social benefit across the population at large, as well as economic development.

4. Finally, Stubbs suggests my criticisms of Third Way politics and my proposals for a robust renewal of social democracy in internationalist terms will alienate people who might otherwise sign up to the Euston Manifesto’s project. This is, at best, a puzzling assertion. I am presenting a personal view in the context of an open discussion on how best to renew social democractic policies in a global economy. Other contributors to the forum have taken alternative positions, some of them closely aligned to New Labour. Stubbs’ comments here appear to exclude free discussion and to seek political orthodoxy in terms of Third Way policies. If this is the case, then these comments are entirely incompatible with the diversity of opinion and free debate that we wish to encourage on these issues. If such debate prevents some people from joining the Euston Manifesto Group, then one wonders in what sense they could possibly be democrats and political liberals.

Shalom Lappin is Professor of Computational Linguistics in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London

1. David Grant suggests that I take free trade and the globalized markets that it is generating to be inevitable processes. This is not the case. They are the result of economic policy decisions and international agreements. Like him, I see free trade as an engine of development that has the potential to produce the wealth necessary to improve living standards and eradicate poverty in the third world. However, precisely because global markets, like all markets, are social artefacts rather than forces of nature, their design reflects the interests of the forces that control them. If they are shaped entirely by private capital and the political agencies which represent it, then the wealth that they produce will be concentrated in the hands of a small business elite. In order to achieve an equitable distribution of this wealth that serves the interests of labour and consumers, as well as producers and investors global markets must be constrained and socialized by political interests that also represent the former. Private business alone cannot promote social or environmental rationality. Moving from the robber baron capitalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the welfare state of the post war years involved such a social rationalization of the market within western countries. This achievement is now seriously threatened by the emergence of global markets that bypass the constraints and redistributative mechanisms of the traditional welfare state. Refashioning them for the global market place is the primary challenge of a renewed social democracy.

2. Grant asks about how I envisage the role of the state in a globalized social democracy. On the model that I am sketching nation states do not disappear, but they enter into federative structures that define open, socialized markets. The EU provides a precedent for this approach. However, to work on a genuinely global scale such a federation will have to include underdeveloped countries and provide for significant investment in them. The emergence of an integrated socialized market of international dimensions will require an extended and complex historical process, as did the transformation of the European Common Market into the European Union.

3. Grant requests that I clarify the grounds and extent of my opposition to the obsessive campaign of privatization that is the focus of much neo-liberal economic policy. Clearly I am not proposing nationalization of industry and finance on the Soviet model. My concern is with the destruction of the robust public domain of services, infrastructure, and utilities that have formed the backbone of the modern welfare state. These have been steadily eroded by the juggernaut of neo-liberalism that has dominated many western economies for the past twenty-five years. These policies have produced disasters like the privatization of British rail and the water companies, the steady decline in British higher education through underfunding, the undermining of the NHS by internal markets and cuts in primary care staff, and the widespread dissipation of municipal services. Neo-liberalism has promoted a massive shift in public policy away from social investment in order to achieve low taxes on business and capital. This has generated a sharp rise in social inequality and a significant reduction in economic mobility for the poor and the middle classes. Wealth is increasingly monopolized by a shrinking economic elite that represents a diminishing proportion of the population. The emergence of global markets has greatly facilitated these patterns. Mobile investment capital and production can maximize profit by moving to low wage countries that impose minimal burdens of corporate taxation and regulation. Neo-liberal trade negotiators seek to use the World Trade Organization as an instrument for undermining public services and social investment in the markets that free trade agreements open up to external competition. They construe these services as a form of government protection that prejudices the interests of private companies looking to enter the fields of heath, education, transportation, and energy. A social democratic approach to free trade will formulate trade agreements and regulatory mechanisms to protect public services, equitable taxation, fair labour practises, and environmental concerns as part of a socialized open market.

4. Celso Rocha points out problems with global unions. In fact, I indicated that such unions would emerge only after vigorous local unions were first established in the low wage economies of the new emerging industries. These will engage in protracted industrial struggles which, if successful, will contribute to a rise in the standard of living in those countries that will contribute to the convergence of economic conditions in the developing countries and in western economies. This process will require a considerable amount of time. On the approach that I am proposing it will also be facilitated by the social investment and regulatory constraints of the international free trade agencies designed to promote a socialized global market.

It should be clear that I am sketching a general approach for redefining the social democratic project, rather than a set of detailed policies. This sketch is intended to provide the basis for ongoing discussion through which the viability of this approach can be tested and clarified. I am grateful to Grant and Rocha for raising important issues as part of this discussion.

Shalom Lappin is Professor of Computational Linguistics in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London

In large parts of the developing world the failure of the secular nationalist groups that secured independence from colonial rule to deliver either prosperity or democracy has produced a deeply reactionary response in the form of revolutionary Islamist movements seeking to establish a universal caliphate. In the West a significant part of the radical left has embraced these movements as agents of anti-imperialism. They have substituted the advocates of jihad for the working class as the vanguard of the revolution. In so doing they have exchanged a programme of class struggle for the politics of cultural identity and created a new socialism of fools. Not a small part of the liberal-left has indulged in a more nuanced version of this bizarre alliance.

The deep sense of instability unleashed by threatening economic changes has been skilfully exploited by the right in the service of xenophobia and racism. Immigrants are presented as a threat to social cohesion and security. Both the radical left and the xenophobic right converge on a fear of globalizing economic patterns and a retreat into protectionist solutions. This is, in effect, a Luddite response that seeks to deal with change by suppressing it. Dalliance with the romance of jihadist fantasies on the left and the rise of racist tribalism on the right are threatening the foundations of liberal democracy in Europe.

In the context of integrated global markets and capital mobility the traditional instruments that social-democratic governments have employed in the past to constrain the power of capital within the welfare state are no longer effective. National labour unions, corporate regulation, a redistributive tax system and extensive universal public services are increasingly difficult to sustain in an environment in which advanced digital technologies and free trade agreements permit companies to move production and investment to low wage economies in order to maximize profit. Labour enjoys no such mobility. Social-democratic governments are discarding their traditional role as agents of progressive reform. Instead they make do with pale efforts at ameliorating the devastation caused by the onslaught of the neo-liberal juggernaut in the public domain and in the work place. Third Way politics is, in general, little more than an attempt to soft-pedal the resigned embrace of neo-liberal economic policies by defeated social democrats as the latest word in progressive thinking.

In order to renew the social-democratic project it is necessary to reformulate it in international terms. Rather than opposing globalizing patterns, social democrats should seek to harness them for social benefit. An internationalized social democracy will seek to prevent the concentration of the new wealth generated by expanded trade in the hands of a small corporate elite. It will formulate global mechanisms for redistributing this wealth to workers and consumers in a way that counterbalances the power of international corporations.

One way to achieve this objective is to promote the creation of strong unions in the new industries emerging in developing countries. Organizing labour for effective collective bargaining in these industries will raise the standard of living in the countries in which they are taking root. This process will lead to the gradual convergence in living standards in the developing world and the West. It will also contribute to the democratization of the former.

Properly negotiated free trade agreements can provide a second important instrument for advancing a new international social-democratic programme. Such agreements will not simply open up markets to international competition. They will require the companies that enter these markets to contribute to the public services and social infrastructure of the countries from which they profit. They will impose fair labour laws, equitable taxation on profits and stringent environmental constraints as conditions for participating in the international market place that they define. Free trade agreements can also be used to cultivate democratic institutions and respect for human rights, as we have seen in the case of EU expansion in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In order for free trade agreements to be instruments of progressive social change and regulation they must be negotiated by governments committed to a new international social-democratic agenda rather than by the representatives of corporate and financial interests.

Shalom Lappin is Professor of Computational Linguistics in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London

Equality and Globalization: A Reply to Beetham and Devine

In their article ‘Left on the Euston Platform’ (from Red Pepper, June 8, 2006), David Beetham and Pat Devine consider the Euston Manifesto’s commitment to social egalitarianism and broad economic equality, and they find it wanting. They criticize the Manifesto’s position on these issues as follows.

This just will not do. The dynamic of global capitalism, with US corporations at its centre, is the main generator of global inequality and environmental degradation…

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, dominated by the US, together with the World Trade Organisation, have imposed a ruthless regime of privatisation and deregulation on developing countries, creating untold inequality, poverty and human misery. Supported by British governments, they have also sought to impose the same Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism on Europe’s social market economies.

In fact, the Euston Manifesto addresses these issues very clearly. The relevant sentences appear at B 4 and B 5.

Democratic trade unions are the bedrock organizations for the defence of workers’ interests and are one of the most important forces for human rights, democracy-promotion and egalitarian internationalism. Labour rights are human rights. The universal adoption of the International Labour Organization Conventions - now routinely ignored by governments across the globe - is a priority for us.

…

The benefits of large-scale development through the expansion of global trade ought to be distributed as widely as possible in order to serve the social and economic interests of workers, farmers and consumers in all countries. Globalization must mean global social integration and a commitment to social justice. We support radical reform of the major institutions of global economic governance (World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank) to achieve these goals, and we support fair trade, more aid, debt cancellation and the campaign to Make Poverty History.

We have expanded on these ideas in subsequent statements. In my speech at the manifesto launch, ‘Towards a Renewal of the Democratic Left’, I suggest a strategy for reformulating the social-democratic project in global terms in order to deal with the corrosive effects of the juggernaut of neo-liberal economic policies in the context of globalized markets. This strategy involves two main elements. The first is the development of strong democratic labour unions in the emerging low-wage industries of the developing world as a way of responding to the exploitation of workers in these countries. If these unions become effective agents of collective bargaining, they will raise the standard of living of wage earners in the developing world and promote the convergence of economic conditions in these countries and the West. This will alleviate poverty and reduce the conflict of interest between workers in the developed and the developing world, and so facilitate the emergence of genuinely international unions able to constrain the power of multi-nationals.

The second instrument for restraining capital in integrated global markets is provided by reconstructing free trade agreements to impose conditions of social investment, fair labour practices, equitable corporate taxation and strict environmental restraint on companies that enter new markets. These conditions will serve to reverse the rampaging privatization that current free trade agreements promote.

The objective of this approach is to effectively transpose the policies of a socialized market and a strong labour movement into international terms that can overcome the current decline of the welfare state that the new mobility of capital has produced. In order for this approach to succeed it is necessary to establish industrial democracy in the developing world and to substitute social-democratic governments for corporate interests as the prime agents responsible for regulating the institutions of the global market.

My speech at the Euston Manifesto launch was based on two articles in Dissent, ‘How Class Disappeared from Western Politics’ (Winter, 2006) and ‘New Labour and the Destruction of Social Democracy’ (Fall, 2000).

Alan Johnson has replied at length along similar lines to earlier versions of the Beetham and Devine criticism of the manifesto on issues of global capitalism.

We have, then, presented a very clearly defined position on global capitalism and neo-liberalism. It calls for empowering workers through strong unions to deal with capital within global markets. We have also called for a radical revision of the institutions regulating international markets, in order to turn them into instruments of social investment rather than simply means of promoting global trade and competition.

By contrast, Beetham and Devine suggest no alternative to the onslaught of neo-liberalism, but simply repeat well-worn slogans condemning American imperialism. In fact, they systematically misdescribe the serious problems posed by the current phase of global capitalism by attempting to reduce it to the projection of American political and military power.

It is certainly the case that the United States has often pursued deeply destructive foreign policies in order to advance its narrow economic concerns (as, without exception, has every major power, as well as not a small number of minor ones). However, the simplistic view that Beetham and Devine suggest misses one of the most important features of integrated global markets and the companies which operate within them. In general, these companies owe no loyalties to any country or constituency beyond their shareholders, who are generally large financial agencies. In the emerging global market companies are able to subordinate national interests to their pursuit of profit, and so they cannot be effectively regulated by national governments.

Beetham and Devine also miss one of the most dangerous economic consequences of the Bush administration’s disastrous tenure, which is its penchant for running up an enormous trade deficit and a massive national debt through unrestrained borrowing and credit. Most of this debt is held by foreign creditors, particularly China and Japan. This situation leaves the United States entirely exposed to a sudden withdrawal of credit, which would quickly undermine the US dollar and destabilize the international economy. In part, this situation has been allowed to emerge precisely because the multinational corporations that have moved production to low-wage economies like China so as to reduce prices and expand sales in American markets, and the financial institutions that provide the credit which continues to fuel unrestrained American consumer spending, represent only their own economic interests rather than those of the United States or any other country. The investors and managements of these companies are genuinely global.

Similarly, the oil industry and the oil-producing countries that keep the United States (and the rest of the world) ruinously addicted to high consumption of fossil fuels, with all of the unfortunate economic and environmental results that this involves, constitute a cartel of global proportions that systematically works against American and Western strategic and economic interests. In promoting international corporate and financial concerns the Bush administration has frequently acted against those of the United States.

Large parts of the left that adhere to Beetham and Devine’s understanding of the world endorse the anti-globalization movement and promote protectionist policies. These policies would close off the expansion of development that is needed to alleviate poverty in the third world, while serving very narrow interests in the West. So, for example, the EU sustains a very high level of subsidy for local produce, and this effectively imposes a substantial tariff on agricultural imports that prevents third world farmers from exporting their crops to European countries. These tariffs violate the principles advocated by the Fair Trade movement and protect agro-business within the EU. But not a small number of anti-globalization enthusiasts support protectionism of this kind under the guise of local control of resources.

Globalization poses a major challenge to the democratic left. In order to meet it, we must devise effective ways of socializing new integrated world markets. Retreating to the tired slogans of past ideological struggles will in no way advance this cause. Instead we must seek a creative redefinition of a progressive social egalitarian agenda within the new conditions that the current phase of global capitalism is generating. The Euston Manifesto presents a first tentative attempt to imagine the outlines of such an internationalist social democracy.

Shalom Lappin is Professor of Computational Linguistics in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London

In Defence of the Euston Manifesto

The Euston Manifesto has attracted considerable reaction both among bloggers and, increasingly, within the mainstream press. A significant part of this comment, even when it has been favourable, has misrepresented the manifesto. It is important to clarify some of the misunderstandings that have emerged. Although Alan Johnson has covered several of these issues in his fine post, a number of points bear further amplification. I will briefly address four of them.

1. The Euston Manifesto is not a pro-war document. While many of its signatories supported the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq, others did not. I have consistently opposed the war as misconceived. I remain convinced that it has caused more damage than good. Specifically, it seems to me that the likely long term outcome of the campaign will be a severe fracturing of Iraq along sectarian lines, with Iran securing a virtual protectorate in the Shiite areas, and the Sunni-dominated sector providing an expanding haven for Islamist and Baathist terrorism that threatens not simply the people of Iraq but much of the Middle East. Where I (and, I believe, other anti-war signatories of the manifesto) part company with much of the official anti-war movement is in refusing to treat the homicidal regime of Saddam Hussein as a marginal problem, and in not being willing to indulge the grotesque fantasy that the terrorist insurgency currently targeting the Iraqi people is a progressive anti-imperialist resistance.

While disagreeing with my pro-war colleagues on the wisdom of the intervention, I strongly endorse their view that the primary objective in Iraq ought to be the development of democratic institutions that protect the human rights and security of all of its people. Some of the most vocal figures in the anti-war movement have brought disgrace upon their cause by first serving as virtual apologists for a fascist regime, and then as propagandists for the terrorists who now seek to destroy any movement towards democratic reconstruction. Moreover, opposing the war in Iraq does not entail rejecting any intervention motivated by a concern to prevent mass murder. Each case must be evaluated on its merits. Unfortunately, this is not the view of a significant number of the high profile leaders of the anti-war movement. They also opposed the American bombing campaign (and any other effort) to halt Milosevic’s assaults in Bosnia and Kosovo. They have sustained an appalling silence over the large scale violence and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, and they would, one suspects, strongly object to any serious move to halt it. This is hardly a progressive political stance. It is a primitive isolationist (and anti-Western) reflex parading as anti-imperialism.

2. The Euston Manifesto is in no sense an endorsement of Third Way economic and social policies or a defence of New Labour. I, like many other signatories, am a social democrat very much concerned to sustain the integrity of the public domain against the onslaught of privatization and expropriation that have resulted from the dogmatic pursuit of neo-liberal ideas. The manifesto focuses on the core values of social egalitarianism and support for organized labour within free unions, but it does not commit its supporters to specific economic models. It is not intended to serve as a detailed party programme or an ideological blueprint. Instead, it identifies a general location in the political spectrum at which liberals, social democrats, and other progressives converge in their view of the basic conditions for sustaining a decent social order.

3. The Euston Manifesto does not engage in cheer-leading for globalizing economic trends, nor does it regard globalization as an unmitigated disaster to be resisted at all costs. It sees the emergence of increasingly integrated world markets as analogous to the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In both cases rapid technological and economic change produced wrenching social upheaval and new wealth. Initially, this wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small business elite with resulting exploitation of labour and expanding class inequalities. As the welfare state and the labour movement emerged, the benefits of industrialization were distributed more evenly and class inequality reduced. The current revolution in global markets and methods of production has rendered the traditional constraints on the power of private capital ineffective. In the face of globalizing pressures European social-democratic governments have largely given up their traditional role as agents of social reform and egalitarianism. Instead, they have been reduced to ameliorating the anti-social effects of change while pursuing business-friendly policies in order to stem the offshore flight of investment to low wage economies.

The great challenge of progressive politics in the current era is to redefine the social-democratic project in internationalist terms in order to promote the creation of an effective set of public instruments for managing a dynamic global economy in the interests of wage earners and consumers. By contrast, part of the left has embraced a radical anti-globalization view. In so doing they have placed themselves in the position of latter day Luddites and romantic agrarians. This is a reactionary stance that seeks to halt development rather than to harness its benefits for the alleviation of poverty and underdevelopment. A progressive political response to globalizing economic patterns does not seek to suppress change or to block development. Its primary objective is to use the opportunities of economic growth to promote social and environmental rationality.

4. The Euston Manifesto is not a cover for disillusioned radicals seeking to adopt a neo-conservative agenda. It is an attempt by people deeply committed to the values of the democratic left to respond to the profound political crisis that now grips Europe and most of the West. This crisis threatens the fabric of liberal democracy, as large swaths of what presents itself as the left make common cause with religious extremism, totalitarianism and anti-Semitism, while xenophobia and social brutality emerge as dominant themes on the right. We find ourselves continuing the struggle of our predecessors in previous generations of the social-democratic left, who fought the perversions of Stalinism and its apologists on one side, and the supporters of a social order designed to service the interests of established privilege and power on the other. Above all our politics are informed by the assumption that for a movement to be progressive in substance rather than in name only, it must seek to sustain and deepen democratic institutions and human rights in any context that it addresses rather than to undermine them. Although this assumption may seem obvious to the point of triviality to some, the ease with which many who speak in the name of the left have discarded its obligations has compelled us to place it at the centre of our manifesto.

Shalom Lappin is Professor of Computational Linguistics in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London